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I.
Introduction
Asylum cases involving domestic violence or gang-related
violence already had high burdens to overcome, but in the summer
of 2018, their underlying theories were inverted and pulled out from
underneath them with the former Attorney General Jefferson
Sessions’s decision in Matter of A-B-.1 The case involved a woman
who had sought asylum in the United States for persecution by her
ex-husband on account of her being a member of the particular
social group of “El Salvadoran women who are unable to leave their
domestic relationships where they have children in common.”2 The
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School of Law. She is grateful to Nick Webb, Class of 2019 at the University of North
Carolina School of Law for his research assistance and helpful input and to Mariah Ahmed,
Class of 2020 for her research on gangs in Central America acting as de facto governments.
Likewise, she is grateful to Raul Pinto, Senior Staff Attorney at the North Carolina Justice
Center for providing his insight in developing these ideas and on an earlier draft and to
Katie Becker, Program Assistant to UNC Clinical Programs, for reading and helping to
polish a later draft. Finally, she is grateful for the students in the 2018-19 Immigration
Clinic for their research, conversations, strategizing, and client representation in the face
of changing immigration policies and law.
1 Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018).
2
Id. at 321.
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respondent was denied asylum in Immigration Court on several
grounds, including that she had failed to show that the “group in
which she claimed membership did not qualify as a ‘particular
social group’ under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A),” and that she had
not shown that the Salvadoran “government had been unable or
unwilling to help her.”3 On appeal, the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) found that the Immigration Court had clearly erred
in making its findings and reversed and remanded the case.4 The
Immigration Court, in August 2017, administratively returned it to
the BIA “in light of intervening developments of law[,]” which
prompted then Attorney General Jefferson Sessions to take the case
for his own review under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i).5 The resulting
decision in Matter of A-B- narrowed the possible protected grounds
for asylum and overruled BIA precedent that recognized certain
survivors of gender-based domestic violence as meriting asylum.6
This decision also departed from precedent to severely restrict who
would be recognized as persecutors.7
United States’ asylum law was originally designed to protect
against persecution committed by a government actor.8 However,
it has long included that someone fleeing harm by a nongovernment
actor could be granted asylum, assuming she met the other elements

3

Id.
Id.
5
Id. at 322–23.
6
Id. at 319 (overruling Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 389 (BIA 2014) as
being wrongly decided).
7 See Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 319–20, 337.
8 Philosophical questions are embedded into Matter of A-B- as well as in our current
asylum law: whom should be protected and from whom? Although I am sure I disagree
with the former Attorney General as to their answers, I agree that these are important
questions for our policymakers. As is discussed below, the U.S.’s current asylum and
refugee law arose to protect a very particular type of harm following World War II. But it
does not adequately provide for current harms, including civil unrest, environmental harm,
or economic harms. See, e.g., Matthew J. Lister, The Place of Persecution and Non-State
Action in Refugee Protection, in THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION: CORE ISSUES
AND EMERGING TRENDS 2–6 (Alex Sager, ed., 2016) (summarizing some of the debates in
asylum law as to whether persecution is a necessary element). See also Elizabeth Keyes,
Unconventional Refugees, 44 N.C. J. INT’L L. 461 (2019); Elizabeth Ferris, Climate
Change, Migration, Law and Global Convergence, 44 N.C. J. INT’L L. 425 (2019). Both
of these Articles enter this philosophical conversation only to illuminate how our current
law could more thoroughly address and thereby protect those who have suffered
persecution at the hands of non-government actors.
4
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of asylum, if she could demonstrate that her home country’s
government was unable or unwilling to protect her from this
nongovernmental harm.9 Matter of A-B- purportedly raised that
“unable or unwilling” standard to require that a government had
“condoned” the nongovernmental or private harm or had
demonstrated a “complete helplessness” to protect against it.10 This
much more stringent standard concluded with the general
proposition that “claims by aliens pertaining to domestic violence
or gang violence perpetrated by non-government actors will not
qualify for asylum.”11 This Article explores cases and policies that
challenge Attorney General Sessions’s claims and suggests ways to
demonstrate when actions and harms by nongovernment actors are
not individual private crimes but products of systemic and cultural
norms that are at the very least tolerated by the home country’s
government.
Part II of this Article provides the legal backdrop to when
persecution by nongovernment actors warrants asylum. Part III
analyzes the Matter of A-B- opinion, examining how it conflated
conflicting standards for evaluating nongovernmental harm and
how it disrupted how asylum cases are being and will be
adjudicated. Part IV provides an analytical framework for the
future. It builds on the historical factors used to evaluate cases
involving nongovernment actors and also sets out new and more
robust factors for advocates and adjudicators to evaluate
nongovernmental harm and a government’s ability and willingness
to protect its populace against this kind of harm. Many of these
factors are aimed at evaluating whether a nongovernment actor had
some de facto power of the government, either by having usurped
9 This Article is only addressing the element that to be granted asylum an applicant
must show that she was persecuted by her home government or by an actor that
government is unable or unwilling to control. Additionally, to have the chance of being
granted asylum, an applicant for asylum has the burden to prove that she suffered that
persecution or has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of one of the five
protected grounds. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13. Each case
should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. See Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d
117, 128–29 (4th Cir. 2011) (“Whether a government is ‘unable or unwilling to control’
private actors . . . is a factual question that must be resolved based on the record in each
case.”) (quoting Menjivar v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2005)); see also Kaplun
v. Att’y Gen. of United States, 602 F.3d 260, 270 (3d Cir. 2010).
10 See Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 337; see also Section II, infra.
11
Id. at 320.
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that power or by having had the government delegate or abdicate
that power.
II.

Persecution by Nongovernment Actors: The
Conventional Backdrop
Our current asylum law takes root in both the United Nations
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Convention),
which was drafted by the United Nations to address and provide
international protection to the thousands of displaced persons
following World War II who had been persecuted and the
subsequent 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
(Protocol).12 The United States acceded to both the Convention and
the Protocol and ratified the Protocol in 1968. Ratifying the
Protocol bound the United States to Articles 2 through 34 of the
Convention, which grant certain rights to refugees.13 To fully
comply with the Protocol, the United States enacted the Refugee
Act of 1980,14 defining “refugee” as:
Any person who is outside any country of such person’s
nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is
outside any country in which such person last habitually resided,
and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that
country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion.15

12 See U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, THE CONVENTION AND PROTOCOL
RELATING
TO
THE
STATUS
OF
REFUGEES
2–3,
available
at
https://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10 [https://perma.cc/47TT-883G]; see also Deborah
Anker, US Immigration and Asylum Policy: A Brief Historical Perspective, in 13 IN THE
DEFENSE OF ALIEN 74, 78–80 (1990) (explaining the history of the U.S. asylum law as not
only deriving from these international treaties following World War II but also out of the
Cold War).
13 See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6259,
189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees]; see also Joan
Fitzpatrick, The International Dimension of U.S. Refugee Law, 15 BERKELEY J. INT’L LAW
1, 1 (1997).
14 Refugee Act, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102; 8 U.S.C. § 1158.
15 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2016). This language essentially mirrors that defining
refugees in the Convention and Protocol. See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
supra note 13, at art. 1; Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19
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Although neither the Convention nor the Protocol specify that
government actors need to be the persecutors, they were
contemplated to protect against a particular harm: “persecution
committed by states” or government actors.16 Nongovernment
persecutors are thus seemingly un-Conventional. Likewise, people
fleeing persecution by nongovernment actors may seemingly be
excepted from the refugee protection arising out of the Convention
and Protocol.
However, the underlying rationale for offering protection to
people fleeing persecution “is not simply the need to give shelter to
those persecuted by the state, but, more widely, to provide refuge to
those whose home state cannot or does not afford them protection
from persecution.”17 The “agent of persecution need not be the
state, but there must be a failure of state protection.”18 This
rationale has long permeated both international law and domestic
law. Both have recognized that where a government is unable or
unwilling to control a certain set of nongovernment actors within its
boundaries, people persecuted by those nongovernment actors may
still be afforded protection as a refugee.19
Guidance by the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for
Determining Refugee Status, first published in 1979,20 provided that
while “[p]ersecution is normally related to action by the authorities
of a country[, it] may also emanate from sections of the population
that do not respect the standards established by the laws of the
U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
16 Lister, supra note 8.
17
Deborah Anker, Refugee Status and Violence Against Women in the Domestic
Sphere: The Non-State Actor Questions, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 391, 394 (2001) (quoting
Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 716–17).
18
Id. (discussing how Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand have
all recognized persecution by non-state actors when a state has failed to protect its people,
particularly in gender-based asylum cases).
19 See, e.g., UNHCR, HANDBOOK AND GUIDELINES ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA
FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS, U.N. Doc. HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV.3, 15 ¶ 65
[hereinafter UNHCR HANDBOOK], available at
https://www.unhcr.org/publications/legal/3d58e13b4/handbook-procedures-criteriadetermining-refugee-status-under-1951-convention.html [https://perma.cc/8CFX-DJGV];
see also Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (BIA 1985), overruled in part by
Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987).
20 UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 1 (providing guidance to state-members for
interpreting the Convention and Protocol).
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country concerned.”21
It explained that “[w]here serious
discriminatory or other offensive acts are committed by the local
populace, they can be considered as persecution if they are
knowingly tolerated by the authorities, or if the authorities refuse,
or prove unable, to offer effective protection.”22
United States law has mirrored the expansion of protection to
those fleeing persecution “at the hands of individuals not connected
with any government” as long as “the government concerned was
either unwilling or unable to control the persecuting individual or
group.”23 Neither its statutes nor its regulations explicitly provide
that the persecution must have been perpetrated by a government
actor or a nongovernment actor the government is unable or
unwilling to control.24 However, the regulations implicitly
acknowledge both state and non-state persecutors. They distinguish
between the two in assessing the risk of persecution if an asylum
applicant were to relocate elsewhere in the home country, stating
that when “the persecutor is a government or is governmentsponsored . . . it shall be presumed that internal relocation would not
be reasonable[.]”25
The BIA has affirmed persecution by nongovernment actors,
finding that even before the Refugee Act of 1980, persecution “had
to be inflicted either by the government of a country or by persons
or an organization that the government was unable or unwilling to
control.”26 It has since repeatedly recognized persecution by
nongovernment actors as being legitimate under asylum law when
the home country was unable or unwilling to control those actors.

See id. at ¶ 65.
22 See id.
23 See Matter of Pierre, 15 I. & N. Dec. 461, 462 (BIA 1975) (citing Matter of Tan,
12 I. & N. Dec. 564 (BIA 1967)).
24
See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b) (2016); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13.
25 See 8 C.F.R § 1208.13(b)(3)(i)-(ii) (providing guidance for determining whether
an asylum applicant can reasonably relocate internally within her home country and
differentiating the risk of harm depending on whether “the persecution is by a government
or is government-sponsored” or not).
26 Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 223 (BIA 1985) (“Our presumption is
reinforced by the fact that in 1978, 2 years before enacting the Refugee Act of 1980,
Congress chose not to define the word ‘persecution’ when using it in other provisions of
the Act because the meaning of the word was understood to be well established by
administrative and court precedents.”); 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(42).
21
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For example, the BIA has recognized, among others, certain
paramilitary groups,27 nationalist groups unconnected to the
government,28 criminal or terrorist groups acting as though they
were governments,29 ethnic tribes,30 and even abusive fathers31 as
nongovernment actors whose governments were unable or
unwilling to control.
Likewise, all of the Circuit Courts of Appeal have granted
asylum to people fleeing persecution by nongovernment actors, and
all have well-established precedent acknowledging asylum would
be appropriate, provided the other elements are met, if the home
country government had been shown to be unable or unwilling to
control.32 The United States Supreme Court has similarly
27 See, e.g., Matter of Villalta, 20 I. & N. Dec. 142, 147 (BIA 1990) (holding that the
respondent from El Salvador merited asylum when he had been threatened by paramilitary
“Death Squads,” who had also killed his brother, and when the Salvadoran government
“appear[ed], at a minimum, to have been unable to control the paramilitary ‘Death Squads,’
whose mission was to annihilate suspected political opponents”).
28 Matter of O-Z- & I-Z-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 23, 24, 26 (BIA 1998) (holding that when
the respondents, who were Jewish nationals of Russia and lived in the Ukraine, were
persecuted by an anti-Semitic, pro-Ukrainian independence and nationalist group and had
“reported at least three of the incidents to the police, who took no action beyond writing a
report . . . that the Ukrainian Government was unable or unwilling to control” the
respondents’ persecutors).
29 See, e.g., Matter of McMullen, 19 I. & N. Dec. 90, 93–94 (BIA 1984) (recognizing
the Provisional Irish Republican Army as a clandestine terrorist organization that was
acting as a government, and which the Irish government was unable and unwilling to
control even in denying the respondent asylum because he had also persecuted others).
30 See, e.g., Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365, 368 (BIA 1996) (holding
that the respondent from Togo had merited asylum when she feared female genital
mutilation at the hands of her Tchamba-Kunsuntu tribe, whom the Togolese government
was unable or unwilling to control).
31 See, e.g., Matter of S-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328, 1335 (BIA 2000) (holding that the
respondent from Morocco merited asylum when “the source of the respondent’s repeated
physical assaults, imposed isolation, and deprivation of education was not the government,
but her own father,” but also where evidence showed that the Moroccan authorities “would
have been unable or unwilling to control her father’s conduct”).
32 See, e.g., Rosales Justo v. Sessions, 895 F.3d 154, 162-63 (1st Cir. 2018); Kamar
v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 811, 818 (6th Cir. 2017); Pan v. Holder, 777 F.3d 540, 543 (2d Cir.
2015); Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 944, 950-53 (4th Cir. 2015); R.R.D. v.
Holder, 746 F.3d 807, 809 (7th Cir. 2014); Gathungu v. Holder, 725 F.3d 900, 906–07 (8th
Cir. 2013); Doe v. Holder, 736 F.3d 871, 873, 877–78 (9th Cir. 2013); Garcia v. Attorney
Gen. of U.S., 665 F.3d 496, 503 (3d Cir. 2011); Lopez v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 504 F.3d
1341, 1345 (11th Cir. 2007); Tesfamichael v. Gonzalez, 469 F.3d 109, 113 (5th Cir. 2006);
de la Llana-Castellon v. I.N.S., 16 F.3d 1093, 1097 (10th Cir. 1994).
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recognized this standard, albeit indirectly.33 For example, in I.N.S.
v. Elias-Zacharias, although the court denied the asylum applicant’s
claim for asylum, because he had not shown he was persecuted on
account of one of the protected grounds, the court did not question
that harms caused by a guerilla group that could not be controlled
by the Guatemalan government could amount to persecution for
asylum.34 Similarly, in his dissent to Negusie v. Holder, Justice John
Paul Stevens distinguished the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”) from asylum and withholding of removal under section
1231(b)(3)(B) of the United States Code by pointing out that CAT
permits a “narrower class of actors”: those who are a “public
official” or who are “acting in an official capacity.”35 He went on
to acknowledge that “asylum and withholding of removal are
available to victims of harm inflicted by private actors, without
regard to state involvement.”36
An applicant for asylum has in the past been able to show that
her home government was “unwilling” to protect her if she could
show that it shared or did not wish to oppose the private actor’s
views about the applicant’s race, religion, or other protected ground,
or that it was unwilling to intervene in what it perceived to be family

33 See I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481–84 (1992); Negusie v. Holder, 555
U.S. 511, 536 n.6 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
34 See I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 481–84; see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.16
(describing the procedure for withholding removal under Section 241(b)(3)(B) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act and withholding of removal under the Convention
Against Torture).
35 Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. at 536 n.6. For CAT claims, torture is defined as ”any
act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflcted
on a person . . by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1) (emphasis
added). A public official or a government may acquiesce to the torture if that official or
government is aware of the tortuous activity or the potential for the tortuous activity before
it happens and that entity breaches its “legal responsibility to intervene to protect” from
that torture. Id. at § 1208.18(a)(7). Recently, the Fourth Circuit recognized that a state
may acquiesce to torture by gangs in El Salvador when evidence showed that the
respondent seeking relief under CAT had reported to Salvadoran police and other public
officials that her son’s life had been threatened by the gangs and that the Salavadoran
officials had turned a blind eye. Cabrera Vasquez v. Barr, No. 18-1226 (4th Cir. 2019),
available at
www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/181226.P.pdf [https://perma.cc/835H-RA8X]. Thus,
even CAT claims may allow for claims by non-state actors.
36 Id.
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disputes or intra-tribal disputes.37 A government might be “unable”
to protect the asylum applicant during times of civil war and also
when it cannot exert influence or authority over the nongovernment
actor.38 For example, failure to investigate reported violence or
crimes or a refusal to make a report could constitute evidence that
the home government was unable or unwilling to control the
nongovernment actor.39 As with all aspects of an asylum claim,
though, an applicant’s testimony must be corroborated by country
condition evidence that shows similarly-situated persons would be
treated similarly as the applicant.40
III.
The Nonconventional Disruption
The standard for proving that the home government was unable
or unwilling to protect someone from persecution by
nongovernment actors has always been high, but in the summer of
2018, Attorney General Sessions suggested that this standard should
even be higher.41 In his Matter of A-B- opinion, the Attorney
General wrote that an asylum applicant seeking to establish
persecution by a nongovernment actor “must show that [her home]
government condoned the private actions or ‘at least demonstrated
complete helplessness to protect the victims.’”42 He also wrote that
37 See UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 19, ¶¶ 65, 98–99; U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGRATION SERVS., Asylum Officer Basic Training Course Participant Workbook:
Asylum Eligibility Part I: Definition of Refugee; Definition of Persecution; Eligibility
Based on Past Persecution, VII.B.4, 46 (2009) [hereinafter AOBTC MANUAL].
38 See AOBTC MANUAL, supra note 37, at VII.B.5, 47; see also Matter of H-, 21 I.
& N. Dec. 337, 345 (BIA 1996) (noting that, even in the presence of UN peacekeepers,
many people within the asylum-seeker’s country of origin were beyond the “rule and
protection of recognized law and social order”); Matter of Villalta, 20 I. & N. Dec. 142,
147 (BIA 1990) (recognizing that the government in the asylum-seeker’s country of origin
appeared to, “at a minimum, control the paramilitary ‘Death Squads’ whose mission was
to annihilate suspected political opponents”).
39 See Matter of H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337, 345 (BIA 1996); Matter of Villalta, 20 I. &
N. at 147.
40 See id.
41 See Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 337 (A.G. 2018).
42 See id. (quoting Galina v. INS, 213 F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir. 2000)). This language
of condoning or demonstrating complete helplessness reflects language in a few cases out
of the Seventh and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeal, all of which applied the “unable or
unwilling” to control standard, despite articulating that the home government must have
condoned the action by the nongovernment actor or demonstrated that it was completely
helpless to prevent those actions. See Galina v. INS, 213 F.3d at 958; Hor v. Gonzalez,
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when “the persecutor is not part of the government,” the adjudicator
must not only consider “the reason for the harm inflicted” but also
“the government’s role in sponsoring or enabling such actions.”43
In framing the standard as one of government condonation or
complete helplessness, Matter of A-B- first inverts the standard,
emphasizing not a government’s ability to protect from certain
harms but its willingness. This inversion, itself, might not
significantly impact how asylum cases with non-state actor harm are
analyzed. However, the shift in language from “unwilling” to
prevent or protect against certain harms to “condoning” those harms
likely raises an asylum seeker's burden of proof. Unwilling
encompasses a tolerance of the harm or a passive reluctance by the
state to get involved. Condonation, however, might include a
willful blindness, but definitely suggests that the state forgives or
even approves of such harm.
For example, police officers may resist confronting gang
members who threatened someone’s life because they, themselves,
are on the gang’s payroll, but they may not approve of the gang
harming the person bringing the charge. An asylum applicant could
more readily show the former by her own account of seeking help
and having it denied coupled with country reports showing that the
police in that area of the country were corrupted by the gangs. She
would have a much more difficult time showing that the police
forgave or approved of this conduct by the gangs. Similarly, a
standard of “complete helplessness” is not merely semantic; it
invokes a higher burden than showing that a government was
“unable” to control the non-state actor or prevent these harms.
Matter of A-B- did not provide any reason for departing from
the “unable or unwilling” standard for evaluating harms committed
by nongovernment actors.44 Nor did it provide an analytical
421 F.3d 497, 501 (7th Cir. 2005); Menjivar v. Gonzalez, 416 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir.
2005). None of these cases rationalized why they departed from their jurisdiction’s
precedent of evaluating only whether the home government was unable or unwilling to
control the nongovernment actor. See Galina v. INS, 213 F.3d at 958; Hor v. Gonzalez,
421 F.3d at 501; Menjivar v. Gonzalez, 416 F.3d at 921. Moreover, all have been
succeeded by cases confirming the “unable or unwilling” to control standard. See, e.g.,
R.R.D. v. Holder, 746 F.3d 807, 809 (7th Cir. 2014); Gathungu v. Holder, 725 F.3d 900,
909 (8th Cir. 2013).
43 Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 318.
44 See id.
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framework for evaluating cases under this heightened standard.45 In
fact, despite including rhetoric suggesting a heightened standard,
Matter of A-B- actually only applied the the “unable or unwilling”
to control standard, thereby muddying how harms by nongovernment actors should be evaluated. Along with the heightened
standard, the opinon stated that the “harm or suffering must be
‘inflicted either by the government of a country or by persons or an
organization that the government was unable or unwilling to
control.’”46 And then, Matter of A-B- only reviewed the underlying
facts and the BIA’s initial review of the case under the “unable or
unwilling” to control standard.47 The decision thus only purported
to heighten the standard—in dicta.
Nevertheless, this rhetoric of condonation or complete
helplessness has, in practice, made asylum harder to seek and harder
to receive.48 Almost immediately after Matter of A-B- was issued,
the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS)49
promulgated policies that reflected this heightened standard.50 DHS
instructed its officers to use this heightened standard when handling
See id. at 318, 320, 337–38.
Id. at 337 (quoting Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (BIA 1985))
(emphasis added).
47 Id. at 344 (“The persistence of domestic violence in El Salvador, however, does
not establish that El Salvador was unable or unwilling to protect A-B- from her husband,
any more than the persistence of domestic violence in the United States means that our
government is unwilling or unable to protect victims of domestic violence.”).
48
Jeffrey S. Chase, A Better Approach to “Unable or Unwilling” Analysis,
JEFFREYS.CHASE.COM (Apr. 21, 2019), available at
https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2019/4/21/a-better-approach-to-unable-orunwilling-analysis [https://perma.cc/7JPV-JGAA] (“Asylum is supposed to afford
protection to those who are fleeing something horrible in their native
country. Somehow, our government has turned the process into an increasingly complex
series of hoops for the victim to jump through in order to merit relief.”).
49 The Department of Homeland Security houses both the United States Citizenship
and Immigration Services and the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement
agencies, among others.
50 See Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 109–10 (D.C. 2018) (finding that
“[t]wo days after the Attorney General issued Matter of A-B-, USCIS issued Interim
Guidance instructing asylum officers to apply Matter of A-B- to credible fear
determinations” and that “USCIS issued final guidance to asylum officers for use in
assessing asylum claims and credible fear determinations in light of Matter of A-B- [in July
2018]”) (citing USCIS Policy Mem., Guidance for Processing Reasonable Fear, Credible
Fear, Asylum, and Refugee Claims in Accordance with Matter of A-B-, July 11, 2018 (PM602-0162) [hereinafter USCIS Policy Mem.]).
45
46
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credible fear interviews and asylum and refugee applications.51
These policies were subsequently challenged as violating the
Administrative Procedure Act, the Immigration and Nationality
Act, and case law, and were then permanently enjoined by the D.C.
District Court from being enforced in Grace v. Whitaker.52
Following this injunction, DHS guidance has since been altered to
again reflect the “unwilling or unable” standard.53 However, the
scope of the injunction and the effect of the changed DHS guidance
is limited to credible fear interviews and credible fear review
hearings, which are conducted by DHS officers.54 The scope does
not extend to removal proceedings, which are the purview of the
Executive Office of Immigration Review in the United States
Department of Justice.55 Attorneys for the Office of Chief Counsel
of the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Immigration Judges, and the BIA still use and argue for the higher
standard to be applied when asylum applicants have suffered harm
at the hands of nongovernment actors.56 And many asylum cases
are being denied under this erroneous and heightened standard.57
In addition to the risk of having this heightened standard of
condonation or complete helplessness continue to be used, argued
for, and applied, there is also the risk that any ensuing analysis will
be too cursorily curtailed. Although it employed the “unable or
unwilling” standard in its own analysis of the underlying facts,
Matter of A-B- refrained from providing a detailed framework for
analyzing when a government is unable or unwilling to protect its
citizens from harms by nongovernment actors.
Rather, it
51 See Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d at 109–10; see also USCIS Policy Mem.,
supra note 50.
52 See Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d at 136–41, 145–46.
53 See Email from John Lafferty, U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services, Asylum
Director, to Asylum Field Office Staff (Dec. 19, 2018) (on file with NCILJ); Email from
Mary Beth Keller, Chief Immigration Judge, U.S. Department of Justice, to Executive
Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) Judges (Dec. 19, 2018) (on file with NCILJ).
54 See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.30(d), 1208.30(g).
55 See Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d at 110–12.
56 Matter of A-B- and Grace v. Whitaker are being appealed, so at the writing of this
Article, this question is far from resolved. In the meantime, however, based on anecdotal
evidence and information on professional listservs, the higher standard of requiring
applicants to show that their home countries condoned or were completely helpless to
protect victims is regularly employed.
57
Chase, supra note 48.
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pronounced that “[n]o country provides its citizens with complete
security from private criminal activity, and perfect protection is not
required.”58 It, likewise, provided that police not acting on “a
particular report of an individual crime does not necessarily mean
that the government is unwilling or unable to control crime, any
more than it would in the United States,” and that asylum applicants
need to show more than that a “crime has gone unpunished, but that
the government is unwilling or unable to prevent it.”59
This reasoning, in focusing on protection not needing to be
perfect, bypasses the analysis of whether the government protection
is effective.60 It is infused with the idea that acknowledging that a
government cannot protect each citizen from every single harm does
not mean that it is unable or unwilling to protect its people from
persecution by a nongovernment actor or that its citizens should be
offered asylum. Undoubtedly, as a result of this reasoning, asylum
applicants will have the burden to show that their home country’s
inability or unwillingness to protect them is not simply a failure to
protect in one individual instance, but rather ineffective protection
that is a part of a larger systemic acquiescence or fallibility. Below,
this Article provides factors for determining when an asylum
applicant has met that burden and shown that a government is
unable or unwilling to protect her against nongovernment harm.61
IV.
The Interventional Framework
Prior to 2017, the United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS) publicly proffered a set of four factors to evaluate
when a government was unable or unwilling to control a

See Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 343 (A.G. 2018).
Id. at 337–38. Attorney General Sessions opines in dicta that both domestic
violence and gang-related violence are private crimes, motivated by greed or vendettas,
that generally “will not qualify for asylum.” Id. at 320, 337. Evaluating the motivation for
the persecution goes to the nexus element: showing that the persecution was on account of
one of the protected grounds. Matter of A-B- also confuses what is required for proving
the nexus element, but analyzing the nexus element is beyond the scope of this Article.
60
See Anker, supra note 17; see also supra Section II discussion.
61 Although, as is discussed in Sections I and II, the heightened standard offered in
Matter of A-B-, suggesting that a government must condone the persecution goes against
the previously accepted “unable or unwilling” standard. The factors in Section III may
often show how the home country condoned the nongovernmental harm, at least implicitly.
58
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nongovernment actor.62 Asylum adjudicators and advocates
evaluated the following to see when an asylum applicant’s home
“government was unable or unwilling to control the actor that
harmed the applicant”63:
a) whether there were reasonably sufficient governmental
controls and restraints on the action[s] that harmed the applicant;
b) whether the government had the ability and will to enforce
those controls and restraints with respect to the entity that harmed
the applicant;
c) whether the applicant had access to those controls and
constraints; and
d) whether the applicant attempted to obtain protection from the
government and the government’s response, or failure to respond,
to those attempts.64

These factors, as well as other guidance about how asylum
claims would be adjudicated, were removed from the USCIS
website sometime in March or April of 2017.65 In fairness, we do
not know that these factors are no longer being used, but there is no
longer the transparency to show that they are being used, and none
of them were mentioned or applied in Matter of A-B-.66
Nevertheless, these factors are only part of the analysis to show that
government is unable or unwilling to control a nongovernment actor
who has committed harms against an asylum applicant. A more

62 The factors were listed in the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
Asylum Officer Basic Training Course Participant Workbook: Asylum Eligibility Part I:
Definition of Refugee; Definition of Persecution; Eligibility Based on Past Persecution
VII.B.1 at 44, which was made available on the www.uscis.gov website. However, all of
the modules that were included as part of this Asylum Officer Basic Training Course were
removed from the USCIS website sometime between March and April 2017. See Removal
of 26 Documents for the Asylum Officer Training from the USCIS Website, SUNLIGHT
FOUNDATION (May 29, 2018) [hereinafter Removal of 26 Documents],
http://sunlightfoundation.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/AAR-6-USCIS-AsylumTraining-Materials-180529.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VNU-DQWN].
63 See, e.g., DREE K. COLLOPY, AILA’S ASYLUM PRIMER: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
U.S. ASYLUM LAW AND PROCEDURE 177 (7th ed., 2015).
64 AOBTC MANUAL VII.B.1, supra note 37, at 44.
65 See Removal of 26 Documents, supra note 62, at 1.
66 See Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018).
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robust set of factors is needed.67
A central question in evaluating whether a government was
unable or unwilling to control a nongovernment actor is whether the
nongovernment actor has some de facto power of the state.68 If a
nongovernment actor can be shown to have some de facto power of
the state, then any harm or violence that actor perpetuates are not
the product of individual private crimes but rather endemic to and
enabled by the system, culture, and state.69 Matthew Lister of
Deakin University in Australia identifies two types of de facto
power by a nongovernment actor that might warrant asylum: first,
when “the authority and power of the state has been usurped by
another power”; or second, “when the state has (implicitly or
explicitly) delegated its power or authority” to nongovernment
actors.70 When the authority of a state has been usurped,
governments are unable to protect its citizens and nationals by
another power.71
Likewise, a government might be shown to have been unwilling
to protect certain citizens and nationals when it has delegated some
of its authority—even implicitly.72 Lister does not address when a
state abdicates some of its power. Implicitly delegating power
could encompass a government abdicating some of its power. But
conceptualizing this power shift as an abdication—which suggests
a failure to fulfill a duty—may be more accurate than thinking of it
as a delegation of power, which suggests a proactive, even if
67
Jeffrey Chase, a former Immigration Judge, offers a Res Ipsa Loquitur test as a new
and better way to conduct the “unable and unwilling” analysis, which would be “to create
a rebuttable presumption of asylum eligibility by allowing the asylum applicant to
establish that the persecution would not ordinarily have occurred if the government had
been able and willing to provide the protection necessary to have prevented it from
happening.” Chase, supra note 48. For example, “when a seven year old girl is kidnapped,
raped, and beaten,” the government would be presumed to have been unable to provide the
necessary effective protection. Id. DHS would then have the burden “to prove that the
government had the effective ability and will to prevent the persecution from happening
in the first place (as opposed to prosecuting those responsible afterwards) by satisfying
whatever complex, multi-level inquiry the courts want to lay out for them.” Id. Assuminng
that this proposed test is not in our immediate future, this Article offers a set of factors and
a framework for the current “unable or unwilling” analysis.
68 See Lister, supra note 8, at 6–7.
69
See, e.g., Anker, supra note 17.
70 Id. at 2.
71 See id. at 7.
72 See id. at 9.
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implicit, conveyance. Building off of the work by Lister, Part A
explores factors to consider, both in country conditions and in
individual cases, for evaluating when a nongovernment actor has
usurped power of the state. Part B then does the same for cases
involving a state’s abdication or delegation of power. Both sections
offer factors that can help analyze when a government not only is
unable or unwilling to protect against harms committed by a
nongovernment actor but also when that government condones that
harm or is completely helpless to prevent it.
A. Usurpation of Power: Gang-Related Violence
When a government’s authority has been usurped by a
nongovernment actor, the government may be unable to protect
those harmed by that nongovernment actor.73 Such cases often
involve situations where a group has effective control over certain
parts of the home country, such as in cases involving civil war or
rebel groups.74 Similarly, though, asylum applicants fleeing gangrelated violence in Central America may be able to show that the
gangs, like MS-13 and Barrio 18, have usurped power and act like
de facto governments. The gangs pervade many Central American
countries and the region: “they are able to impose their will and
effectively threaten those who oppose them without significant fear
or expectation that the government of the country will be able to
stop or significantly impede them, or even to offer protection to
those endangered.”75
To evaluate whether a nongovernment actor, like a gang, has
usurped state power requires looking at both the country conditions
and the individual applicant’s facts and asking the following:
•

Whether the nongovernment actor serves functions of the
government for the territories it controls or where it
operates. Does it, for example, provide its own form of
services, benefits, or protection? Does it collect a form

See id. at 7.
74 See id. at 7–8; see, e.g., Espinoza-Cortez v. Att’y Gen. of the United States, 607
F.3d 101 (3d Cir. 2010).
75 Lister, supra note 8, at 8 (citing Jeffrey D. Corsetti, Marked for Death: The Maras
of Central America and Those Who Flee Their Wrath, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 407, 409–16
(2006)).
73
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of taxes, like extortion fees?76 Does it provide its own
security or have its own militia or armed forces?
Whether the nongovernment actor has infiltrated the
government or corrupted the government. Does the
government pay or receive payments from the
nongovernment actor?
Is there a history of
nongovernment groups being connected to the
government, like paramilitary groups? Or a history of
human rights abuses by groups sanctioned by the
government that are now the nongovernment actors?77
How recently? Are there members of the nongovernment
actor working in or for the government? Or vice versa?
Are the nongovernment actors and government actors
viewed differently by the public or intermingled and
indistinct in the public’s eye?
Whether the government had reasonable “controls and
restraints” over the nongovernment actors and whether it
enforced those controls.78 Are nongovernment actors
punished for their crimes or are they treated with
impunity? Were they punished in the individual asylum
applicant’s case?

The more of these factors that tilt toward the nongovernment
actors having usurped authority of the government, the more they
are a de facto or quasi-government, and the more likely that an
asylum applicant should be able to show that her home government
was unable, or even completely helpless, to protect her from harms
inflicted by these nongovernment actors. Of course, she would still
have to show that in her individual case she attempted to obtain
protection and was refused, or the government failed to respond to

76 See Lauren Gilbert, Gender Violence, State Action, and Power and Control in the
Northern Triangle, in FROM EXTRACTION TO EMANCIPATION: DEVELOPMENT REIMAGINED
261 (Raquel Aldana & Steven Bender eds., 2018) (discussing how both MS-13 and Barra
18 impose a “war tax” on the residents and businesses in their territories).
77 See id. at 260 (discussing how in the Northern Triangle countries of Central
America the same actors who were once a part of the paramilitary groups, “death squads
and civil defense patrols with nebulous links to the police, military, and ruling class”
during the countries’ civil wars “have reorganized themselves into new structures of
repression . . . but still with the private-state collaboration or acquiescence”).
78 See AOBTC MANUAL VII.B.1, supra note 37, at 46.
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her attempts,79 or that seeking assistance from authorities would
have been futile.80 Yet the more intertwined the government and
nongovernment actor are, or are perceived to be, the more futile,
and potentially dangerous, seeking assistance from the government
for harms caused by the nongovernment actor would be. Similarly,
the more the nongovernment actor can act with impunity, the more
futile it will be for someone to go to the government for protection.
The above factors allow for an applicant, advocate, and
adjudicator to show the home government is not merely allowing a
crime to go unpunished,81 but rather that the nongovernment actor
has usurped some of the government’s power and the government
is unable to protect someone from the harm.
B. Abdication or Delegation of Power: Gender-based
Violence
When a government has abdicated or delegated its power (or
some of its power) to nongovernment actors, the government may
demonstrate that it is unwilling to protect its citizens or nationals
against harm by those nongovernment actors.82 It is an easier case
when the government has explicitly delegated its authority, but that
rarely happens.83 However, the same may be true when the
government has delegated some of its authority implicitly or has
failed to fulfill its duty, abdicating some of its power. In these cases,
the government “could plausibly provide protection, but it does
not.”84 Professor Lister asserts that a state may implicitly delegate
“its power or authority over certain populations or parts of life
because it expects or wishes others to act with authority in these
areas.”85 Traditionally, he notes, these cases involved “ethnic or
religious violence[,]” but now the “dominant cases have involved

See id. at 46.
80 See, e.g., Ornelas-Chavez v. Gonzales, 458 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir. 2006)
(exempting an applicant from having to show that she sought assistance from her home
government, if she can “convincingly establish that doing so would have been futile or
have subjected [her] to further abuse”).
81 See Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018).
82 See Lister, supra note 8.
83 See id.
84 Id. at 9 (emphasis in original).
85 Id.
79
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gender:”86
In such cases we see societies where control over certain classes
or groups of women—wives, unmarried daughters, and the like—
is largely delegated to particular groups of males—fathers,
husbands, sometimes older brothers, and similar figures . . . .
Examples here include the enforcement of modesty and chastity,
female genital cutting or mutilation, and domestic violence. It is
important to see that, in these cases, the state is not merely unable
to protect the people subjected to harm, but has made a decision
to allow others, typically closely related males, to exercise
authority in these areas of life.87

In some countries, it may be that the state has implicitly
delegated this authority over its female citizens, which would help
to show that a country was not only unwilling to protect its females
from private gender-based harm but also that it has condoned that
violence. In other countries, however, the power shift may be more
accurately one of abdication. If a historically machoistic88 country
has new more equitable laws and if its cultural and societal norms
are changing, the state may not be actively giving its males some of
its authority. Rather, it may be so accustomed to abdicating its
power to protect its female citizens that it will continue to fail in this
duty. For instance, a government that does not enforce its laws
against female genital mutlation or domestic or sexual violence and
allows its male citizens and nationals to act with impunity
demonstrates that it is unwilling to protect its female citizens and
nationals from this type of nongovernment harm.89 It likewise may
be overlooking, and thereby passively condoning, this harm. In
these situations, gender-based harm is not merely caused by a

Id.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
88
The following questions may help evaluate whether a country had or has a
machoistic culture: Does evidence suggest that males in the country are (or were) preferred
over females? Are females viewed as property of their male counterparts? Were they in
the past? Are females viewed as inferior? Unlike the factors included below for evaluating
whether a state has abdicated or delegated some of its authority, these questions do not
directly address actions by the state. However, they may be useful nonetheless for
analyzing and framing asylum claims.
89 Lister, supra note 8, at 10.
86
87
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private actor, but rather by a system and culture that enables such
violence.90
To evaluate whether a government has abdicated or delegated
some of its authority, particularly with regard to control over certain
persons of one gender by another gender, requires looking at the
country’s laws, the country conditions, and the individual
applicant’s facts and weighing the following:
•

•

•

Whether the country has laws criminalizing domestic or
intimate partner violence and femicide or laws promoting
gender equality. Not only do these kinds of laws exist,
but also what is the history of those laws? How recent
are they and in what context were they made? Are there
or were there previously laws condoning violence against
wives or children? Are there or were there laws of
coverture? How recently?
Whether the home country enforces its laws criminalizing
gender-based violence or promoting gender equity. Are
reports of domestic or intimate partner violence generally
investigated? Are they prosecuted? Are they punished?
How often? What portions of the national budget or local
budgets are devoted to enforcing these laws? What
funding is spent on training police officers, prosecutors,
and judges about gender-based violence?
Whether the government offers resources and support
services to survivors of gender-based violence. What
services are offered and where? How accessible are these
resources and services? For example, are there shelters
for survivors or gender-based violence agencies? Where
are they located? How many people do they serve? What

90 See Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 318 (A.G. 2018) (providing that the
analysis of whether nongovernment harm amounts to persecution for the purposes of
asylum needs to evaluate “the government’s role in sponsoring or enabling such actions”);
see also Anker, supra note 17 (“In many countries where protection is not available, ‘it is
the very inattention and inaction by the state in relation to battering that tacitly condones
and sustains it as a systematic practice. In other words, the fact that [a] state does not
adequately protect women from domestic and sexual violence is both an institutional
manifestationof the degraded social status of women and a cause of its perpetuation’”)
(quoting Audrey Macklin, Cross-Border Shopping for Ideas: A Critical Review of United
States, Canadian, and Australian Approaches to Gender-Related Asylum Claims, 13 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 25, 48 (1998)).
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funding is devoted to providing and promoting these
services? Was the nongovernmental harm punished in
the applicant’s case? Was it handled in a similar manner
to other similar acts of harm in the country?
Whether the country has a history of using gender-based
violence as part of state-sponsored terrorism.91 Is there a
history of a repressive government? Is there a history of
the state using rape and other human rights violations as
tactics in war or by paramilitary groups affiliated with the
government? How recently?

When the factors in any individual case suggest that the
government has abdicated or delegated some of its power or
authority to a portion of its population, an asylum applicant will be
more able to show that her government was unwilling to protect her
from harms by that nongovernment actor.92 As with showing that a
nongovernment actor usurped state power, the applicant must show
that she sought help from the government but did not receive it or
that doing so would be futile or subject her to more harm.93 Each
asylum case is fact-based and should be decided on a case-by-case
basis,94 but the more these factors weigh in favor of there being a
systematic subjugation of a particular gender, the more they
demonstrate that the government has abdicated or delegated its
authority, and the more futile it will be for a female citizen or
national of the country to seek assistance from the government. In

See Gilbert, supra note 76, at 261.
In discussing this project with people, some have questioned whether these factors
will lead to everyone from a particular country who have suffered similar harms by
nongovrnmental actors being granted asylum (i.e., the floodgates argument). Given how
high the burden is to proving and prevailing on an asylum claim beyond the element of
when a non-state actor might be the persecutor, I think the chance of opening floodgates
is low. Moreover, that numerous people may be eligible for asylum from a particular
country is not an issue in evaluating claims based on persecution on account of their race,
religion, or nationality, so it should not be when the protected ground is membership in a
particular group or when that harm is perpetrated by a non-state actor that the home
government is unable or unwilling to control.
93 See, e.g., Rosales Justo v. Sessions, 895 F.3d 154, 166 (1st Cir. 2018) (reversing
the BIA’s decision that the Immigration Judge had erred in finding that the Guatemalan
government was unable to protect the respondent seeking asylum when “evidence in the
record [demonstrated] that such a report would be futile or even dangerous”); see also
Ornelas-Chavez v. Gonzales, 458 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir. 2006).
94
Even Matter of A-B- acknowledges that cases are to be assessed a case-by-case
basis. See Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 329, 331 (A.G. 2018).
91

92
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turn, it will be more likely that the person fleeing this harm will be
able to show that she merits protection in the form of asylum.
V.
Conclusion
Demonstrating eligibility for asylum has always been difficult.
The laws for proving some of the most disputed and dynamic
elements were made even more complex and complicated with the
Matter of A-B- opinion issued in the summer of 2018. This opinion
raises philosophical questions about whom our asylum system
should be protecting and from whom, as well as how our laws might
better protect people from contemporary harms. One particularly
polemical and philosophically fraught question it raises is when
does our asylum law protect those who a fleeing persecution
perpetrated by a nongovernment actor? The factors set forth in this
Article are meant to give applicants, advocates, and adjudicators an
intervening framework for navigating and evaluating systemic
issues surrounding persecution by nonstate actors and to give light
to when a home government is unable or unwilling to protect its
own citizens and nationals from nongovernmental harm.

